Lobbying on multiple routes to influence national legislation: German federalism and the European Union

Abstract

The article analyses how interest groups lobby at different levels of government to influence national legislation. Adapting Greenwood’s (2017) argument about routes for influence-seeking in the EU to national policymaking in a multi-level system, we argue that interest groups can pursue three distinct multi-level routes to circumvent the national executive and parliament: a Brussels route, a domestic subnational route, and a subnational-Brussels route to national policymaking. Investigating the case of Germany, our analysis of survey data on interest group behaviour shows that, firstly, multi-level-lobbying is a complement rather than a substitute to national-level lobbying. Secondly, interest groups try to affect federal legislation much more often via the subnational than via the supranational level, especially when they share a common goal with their subnational government. A third finding is that groups also address venues without formal legislative power. Overall, our study shows the strategic importance of multi-level lobbying in national policymaking.