The double empathy problem and the problem of empathy: neurodiversifying phenomenology

Abstract

The notion that autistic individuals suffer from empathy deficiencies continues to be a widespread assumption, including in many areas of philosophy and cognitive science. In response to this, Damian Milton has proposed an interactional approach to empathy, namely the theory of the double empathy problem. According to this theory, empathy is fundamentally dependent on mutual reciprocity or salience rather than individual, cognitive faculties like theory of mind. However, the theory leaves open the question of what makes any salient interaction empathic in the first place. The aim of this paper is to integrate core tenets of the theory of the double empathy problem specifically with classical, phenomenological descriptions of empathy. Such an integration provides further conceptual refinement to the theory of the double empathy problem while recognizing its core tenets, but it also introduces important considerations of neurodiversity to classic, phenomenological descriptions of empathy.