Control of skippers' fishing strategies and crew labour by companies: Role of the remuneration system

Abstract

In this study, the remuneration system applied in the French Guyana shrimp fishery is analyzed in relation to the market changes that this fishery has experienced since 1985. The contract used for the crew members is not the classical share contract usually observed in fisheries. It is a piece rate wage with quality-bonuses. In the classical contract theory literature the piece rate contract is thought to avoid effort shirking but to induce quality shirking. The bonuses are introduced here in order to limit the quality shirking which may occur during grading and storing operations on board. The skippers' contract also differs from the share contract. It is based on remuneration parameters controlled by the companies. By changing these parameters between 1987 and 1991, the companies led the skippers to modify their fishing strategies and especially to concentrate their efforts towards small sized shrimp. The companies thus became able to respond to the increasing demand for small shrimp categories which characterises the French market. The evolution of the spatial distribution of the fleet effort over the same period is consistent with this hypothesis: the fleet has moved towards fishing zones where small shrimp are known to he in abundance.