Price and carbon emission reduction technology competition in the electricity supply chain based on power structure

Abstract

This study considers the research on electricity pricing and carbon reduction technology decisions of electricity supply chain enterprises under different power structures. It constructs a two-level electricity supply chain game model composed of two electricity producers and a single electricity retailer. By comparing the equilibrium solution results, the main research results are as follows: (1) in the market structure where electricity producers and electricity retailers make decisions at the same time, electricity producers are more willing to invest in low-carbon technologies and increase carbon emission reduction. The electricity retailer also set the lowest electricity prices at this time, and electricity demand is the highest. (2) In the case of the Stackelberg game for electricity producers, the wholesale electricity price is the highest, and the electricity producers obtain the most profits. In the case of the Stackelberg game for electricity retailers, the electricity price is the highest, and the profit of the electricity retailer is the highest. (3) In the market structure dominated by electricity retailers, the electricity price is the highest, and the electricity producers reduce the investment in carbon emission reduction technology after observation; the carbon emission reduction intensity is the least, and the electricity demand is also the least. (4) With the increase of price competition coefficient, the intensity of carbon emission reduction, electricity demand, electricity producers, and electricity retailer profit increase. However, as the competition coefficient of carbon reduction technology increases, these equilibrium solutions decline. We verify the above conclusions using multi-agent simulation.