Abstract
It is a shared opinion that Russell’s and Quine’s critiques were a definitive demolition of Meinongianism. It is not clear, though, exactly what Russell and Quine demolished. The Parmenidean philosophers may have wanted to dismiss both (a) the claim that there are nonexistent objects, and (b) the Unrestricted Comprehension Principle, in a single move. But the two should be kept distinct.
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APA
Berto, F. (2013). Meinongianisms of the First, Second, and Third Kind. In Synthese Library (Vol. 356, pp. 115–151). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4207-9_6
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