La gestion associative de la pêche en France: Une analyse économique à partir du cas des salmonidés

Abstract

On behalf of economic analysis and some French empirical data, it is questionable that the associative management of freshwater recreational fishing in France is leading to collective welfare maximization. Our analysis relies on the salmonids case. On one hand, fishing effort is probably too high at the best and easy to access fishing sites, which can lead to welfare losses due to overcrowding. On the other, riverside landowners are not sufficiently incited to improve environmental quality while anglers express a positive willingness to pay for improvements. These inefficiencies are explained by the conjunction of three phenomena. First, private property rights are attenuated under the pressure of legislative dispositions. Second, the angling associations do not control enough individual and collective fishing effort. Finally, halieutic policies focus on resource protection and are, while necessary, not enough to maximize the social rent associated with recreational fishing. The regulation of fishing effort and the bargain of some environmental goods and services on the basis of beneficiary-pays principle could help to improve collective welfare. Equity in access could be insured through social pricing.