Leakage resilient of timing side channel attack for key exchange security mode

Abstract

In leakage resilient cryptography, leakage resilient key exchange (KE) protocols are constructed to resist side channel leakage attack. Side channels attacks take place during the execution of the cryptographic schemes or protocols. For a KE protocols to stay secure, counter measures must be employed on the cryptographic primitives instantiated during the protocol building to counter side channel leakage attacks. This work propose a leakage resilient key derivation function (KDF) primitive to be instantiated on KE protocol. Then, this work proceed to define a security model to show the leakage resilient (KDF) is provably secure using indistinguishability game-hopping technique. Lastly, this work revisit the KE protocol proposed by Alawatugoda and construct an improved leakage resilient KE protocol by instantiating our proposed leakage resilient KDF.