Mental Transparency, Direct Sensation, and the Unity of the Cartesian Mind

Abstract

An old question continues to rankle: Does Descartes hold that external objects are cognized only indirectly, by means of our directly cognizing some form of representative stand-in? Does he subscribe, in other words, to a “veil of perception” account of cognition?1 The view that he does, in one form or another, has been defended by many scholars,2 as has the view that he does not,3 in one form or another, with the latter generally addressing “primary” qualities. In this paper I examine the following (style of) argument, which has provided much impetus for the “veil” camp, particularly with respect to “secondary” qualities: (A)Cartesian sensory qualities–in particular, “secondary” qualities–do not resemble the real (or “primary”) physical qualities generally causing sensory perception, and so must be construed as mental entities. During sensation we are aware of the former and not the latter. Therefore, either we are not aware of the physical qualities at all, strictly speaking, or, we are aware of them only indirectly, by being aware of the sensory qualities which are their representative stand-ins. In either case sensory qualities, or ideas thereof, constitute a “veil” screening the mind from direct sensory contact with the external world.