Bureaucratic Accountability and Disaster Response: Why Did the Korea Coast Guard Fail in Its Rescue Mission During the Sewol Ferry Accident?

Abstract

The Sewol ferry accident, occurring in the ocean in South Korea on April 16, 2014, resulted in the loss of 304 lives. Some argue that one of the primary reasons for such an excessive death toll was because the post-disaster rescue operations led by the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) were neither timely nor efficient and effective. In this study, we attempt to understand whether there was any systemic cause behind such an unsuccessful disaster response on the part of the KCG. In doing so, we analyze the KCG's aptitudes, attitudes, and behaviors vis-à-vis its rescue operations in the broader context of Sewol ferry disaster management, while utilizing the classic theories of bureaucratic accountability. We conclude this research by arguing that the KCG was more concerned about hierarchical, political, and legal accountability than professional accountability in the midst of the accident, and discuss theoretical and practical ramifications of our findings.