Constructing "electronic Liability" for International Crimes: Transcending the Individual in International Criminal Law

Abstract

It is increasingly clear that autonomous agents cancommit international crimes such as torture and genocide. This article aims to construct 'electronic liability' for such international crimes. It will argue that it is not sufficient to hold the persons or programmers behind the autonomous agents liable, but that it should be possible to hold the autonomous agents that commit international crimes liable. Itwill examine ways in which legal personality can be attributed to machines and argue that if there is a continuumof potential subjects of ICL, then the argument for electronic personhood and liability of machines is as compelling as for other non-humans such as corporate entitiesandanimals. Itwill bearguedthat theICCwill potentially only be able tomeaningfully prosecute international crimes committed by autonomous agents if it is willing to accommodate strict liability and other faultlessmodels of liability that have so far been anathema to international criminal justice.