Evolutionary Game Analysis of Energy‐Saving Renovations of Existing Rural Residential Buildings from the Perspective of Stakeholders

Abstract

To promote the orderly development of energy‐saving renovations of existing rural residential buildings, it is necessary to coordinate the interests of various stakeholders. This study selects three key stakeholders—the government, energy‐saving service enterprises and rural residents—as the research subjects and analyzes their interests and rights. In the meantime, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the evolutionary rules and evolutionary stable strategies of tripartite behaviors, on the basis of which the influencing factors are analyzed. The research results show that: (1) as the supervisor and advocate of energy‐saving renovations in existing rural residential buildings, the government, by adopting subsidies and fines, effectively fosters enthusiasm about energy‐saving service enterprises among rural residents, encouraging them to participate in energy‐saving renovations of existing rural residential buildings; (2) when the income of energy‐saving renovations exceeds their cost, changes in the initial willingness ratio of the stakeholders, the government subsidies and fines only affect the evolution of the system so that it reaches a balanced and stable state, without changing the three parties’ behavioral strategy choices in the game; (3) when the income from energy‐saving renovations is lower than the cost, the behavioral strategies of the three parties in the game are all uncooperative; (4) key factors affecting tripartite cooperation in the game are as follows: government subsidies and fines, the overall interests of society, government supervision costs, loss of corporate image, standardization of the skills and services provided by enterprises, and willingness of rural residents to participate in the transformation.