Power, policy ideas and paternalism in non‐communicable disease prevention

Abstract

Non‐communicable disease prevention is shaped in large part by the ability of political actors to manipulate policy ideas. Actors that acquire sufficient policy‐making power – usually through building social legitimacy – can work to ensure that certain ideas become influential in the policy‐making process, thus making it more likely that their own interests are reflected in policy outcomes. This paper will argue that private actors, specifically multinational corporations, have been effective in achieving this to the extent that non‐communicable disease policy has become dominated by ideas that are likely to lead to ineffective outcomes, thus reflecting private interests. It is therefore argued that efforts are needed to shift the balance of policy‐making power back towards public interests. This would, it is argued, lead to an increase in regulation that could be accused of being paternalist – an eventually that can however be justified both ethically and legally.