Evolutionary Game Analysis of Building Energy Services: Incentives and Mechanisms Based on Voluntary Emission Reduction Agreements

Abstract

Drawing upon the voluntary agreement mechanism for emission reduction, an evolutionary game model has been developed between construction firms and building energy efficiency service companies. This model seeks to elucidate the drivers that prompt construction firms to engage in voluntary energy efficiency agreements and compels energy efficiency service companies to deliver superior services under varied socio-economic conditions. Insights were derived from extensive study and enhancement of game theory. The study reveals that the convergence of the game system to a favorable Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is contingent on the associated benefits and costs for both entities when rendering the service. Furthermore, the efficacy and distribution of energy efficiency incentives play a pivotal role. To foster the sustainable growth of decarbonization within construction entities and the market for building energy services, participants of the game ought to bolster technological advancements, cement collaboration between industrial, academic, and research sectors, augment transparency in information dissemination, and elevate consciousness regarding societal responsibility, energy conservation, and environmental protection. This model provides valuable insights for policymakers to frame effective strategies that boost engagement from all game participants, thereby fostering the growth of the building energy conservation sector. It also offers a robust framework for future collaborative efforts between industry, academia, and research establishments.