Norms of Epistemic Diversity

Abstract

E P I S T E M E 2 0 0 6 23 M i r i a m S o l o m o n Norms of Epistemic Diversity abstract Epistemic diversity is widely approved of by social epistemologists. Th is paper asks, more specifi cally, how much epistemic diversity, and what kinds of epistemic diversity are normatively appropriate? Both laissez-faire and highly directive approaches to epistemic diversity are rejected in favor of the claim that diversity is a blunt epistemic tool. Th ere are typically a number of diff erent options for adequate diversifi cation. Th e paper focuses on scientifi c domains, with particular attention to recent theories of smell. Epistemic diversity is widely approved of by social epistemologists. Epistemic diversity oft en produces dissent on the theories or the strategies worth pursuing. Dissent is valued for at least three reasons: it produces worthwhile criticism (e.g. Mill, Feyerabend, Popper, Longino), division of cognitive labor (e.g. Hull, Goldman, Kitcher, Solomon) and social distribution of knowledge (e.g. Haraway, Longino, Solomon, Sunstein). Another epistemic value of diversity is creativity. Intellectual biographies oft en point out aspects of an investigator's background that made them diff erent from others thinking about the subject and led to their unique contribution to a fi eld. For example, Wegener's experience with icebergs in Arctic exploration and his knowledge of meteorology were cognitive resources for his later idea that continents can drift . Creativity is not discussed much by mainstream social epistemologists. Th e traditional focus is on reasons and causes of choice among available alternative theories, rather than on the creation of those alternatives themselves. Perhaps this is due to a traditional focus on the context of justifi cation rather than the context of discovery. Creativity is discussed more—at least implicitly—by feminist social epistemologists. For example, Helen Longino sees her interactive model of the causes of human behavior as developing from feminist values. Th is paper will, likewise, consider the context of discovery as well as the context of justifi cation. Th e main question to be discussed in this paper is How much epistemic diversity and what kinds of epistemic diversity are normatively appropriate? Should we be doing anything to increase or decrease the amount of diversity or the types of diversity? I'm going to focus on scientifi c domains, because that is my area of expertise. Th ere may be implications for other knowledge domains. Two positions on epistemic diversity are already well known. First, the laissez-faire view that there is enough epistemic diversity, and no special eff orts need be made to increase