The creditor duty post Sequana: lessons for legislative reform

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Abstract

UK common law recognises that directors owe a fiduciary duty to consider creditors' interests when a company is insolvent or in financial difficulty. However, the scope of this duty remains unclear, particularly the degree of financial difficulty necessary for it to arise. In 2022, in BTI v Sequana, the Supreme Court did little to resolve these uncertainties, retaining a context first approach, where the duty's triggering point is based on the facts and the risk borne by creditors in the specific case. In contrast, Ireland codified its creditor duty in 2022, setting out a series of legislatively defined financial situations where the duty applies and what the duty entails. This article argues that while a search for complete doctrinal certainty in this area is misguided, a degree of certainty over and above the position in Sequana can be achieved and that Ireland's codification offers valuable lessons for future UK reform.

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APA

Quinn, J., & Gavin, P. (2023). The creditor duty post Sequana: lessons for legislative reform. Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 23(1), 271–296. https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2023.2226802

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