(In)accurate Intuition: Fast Reasoning in Decision Making

Abstract

Dual-process theories postulate a distinction between fast, automatic, intuitive and error-prone (Type 1) versus slow, controlled, deliberate and analytic (Type 2) processes. When less time is available, performance is predicted to be based on low-effort Type 1 processes, which leads to an increase in biases. Using variations of the gambler's fallacy task with or without time pressure, we will test whether Type 1 processes are indeed more error-prone than Type 2 processes and how this discrepancy is modulated by individual differences in impulsivity and cognitive abilities. It is hypothesized that i) people with high expertise levels will perform equally well both under and without time pressure; and ii) people higher on cognitive abilities will perform equally well under time pressure and without time pressure, unlike those with lower cognitive abilities. Throughout life, humans experience circumstances requiring them to make decisions involving probability information. These circumstances often require quick1 responding and the outcomes of these decisions can have life changing consequences. For this reason, studying the processes underlying decision-making behaviour is of great importance. 1Correspondence Dilara Berkay dilara.berkay@yahoo.com Decision-making has been subject to many empirical studies. Central to the entire empirical investigation of reasoning and decision-making processes are traditional dual-process theories (Evans, 2011), to which researchers have shown an increased interest over the last four decades