Information Warfare and Deterrence

Abstract

The essence of the Information Age is the emergence of a new form of organization. The information technology network seamlessly connects all of its parts, creating shared situational awareness throughout an organization. High connectivity supports both enhanced sustainability and greater accessibility. Information warfare is best understood by focusing on the concept of connectivity as both a societal and military asset. For strategists seeking to deter this new form of war, connectivity is a double-edged sword. Deterrence requires that the capability to inflict retaliatory costs be perceived as reliable. Deterrence weakens to the degree that the deterrent capability can be contested by a challenger through degradation or avoidance. The inherent accessibility of information technology invites challenges to a network's connectivity. Deterrent threats relying on such connectivity will be susceptible to technical, tactical, and operational contest. The contestability of connectivity will make deterrence of information warfare difficult. This article concludes that deterrence models developed during the Cold War will provide poor guidance for strategic thinking about this new form of war, which is better understood in the context of offense and defense.