Abstract
Aumann (1976) shows that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for Edo coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty finite event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at F that the agents cannot tell whether E occurred. Second, this still holds true at F, when F itself becomes common knowledge. © 2011 Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet.
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CITATION STYLE
Lehrer, E., & Samet, D. (2011). Agreeing to agree. Theoretical Economics, 6(2), 269–287. https://doi.org/10.3982/te578
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