Regional problems as expressions of social thought

Abstract

Here, the phrase 'regional problem' refers to the situation in which a region or part of the territory of a nation-state constitutes social, political and/or economic problems for the society of the nation-state. This definition is necessary, firstly because in certain geographical schools, the Western concept of 'region' was understood as an operational concept, and was an exclusive object of geography (the regionalizing myth in geography referred to by David Livingstone) ; and secondly, the Japanese concept chiiki is still understood by some Japanese geographers to denote any demarcated space regardless of scale. A regional problem in this sense becomes explicit only when the region in question is incorporated into a nation-state, but the origin or cause of the regional problem exists from before the incorporation takes place. For instance, the Southern problem in Italy became a regional problem for Italy immediately after the unification of modern Italy in the 1860s, but the origin or remoter cause of the problem lay in the complete difference of the historical background of Southern Italy from those of Northern and Central Italy, and in the process of Italian unification (risorgimento), which was realized in the form of a military conquest of the South by the North. When the region in question was no longer part of the national territory, it ceased to cause regional problems. As another instance, for a long time Ireland constituted a regional problem of the British Empire (the Irish Question), but when the Free State of Ireland was formed in 1923, it ceased to be a regional problem; Northern Ireland, however, has to this day constituted a regional problem for the United Kingdom, as a sequela, so to speak, of the Irish Question. From the comparative viewpoint, it is possible to point out certain criteria for a typology of regional problems in various states of the modern and contemporary world. 1) Substance of the problem. Regional problems have multifarious facets - economic disparity; cultural differences, especially the imposition of an official language on people accustomed to a different dialect; political discrimination against certain regions by the central goverment. In this case, it is necessary to understand that at times, the substance of regional problems appears to differ according to whether it is observed from the viewpoint of elite culture or that of folk culture. If we applied the distinction made by Redfield between "great tradition" and "little tradition," we find that, generally, religion - which by its very nature is considered to be universal - officially does not constitute a regional problem, but at the level of folk culture (or little tradition), it actually constituted and still constitutes the cause or motif of regional problems, as was seen in Ireland and is occurring in many other countries. It is not sufficient merely to analyze the substance of regional problems; more important is an analysis of the mechanism by which regional problems continue to exist or are reproduced. 2) Character of the nation-state and the attitude of various political powers towards regional problems. The nineteenth-century ideology of nation-states, or the so-called self-determinism of nations invariably contained elements of fiction: almost all the nation-states included within them territorial ethnic minorities, and judgement as to whether a territorial ethnic group deserved to be called a nation was always made by the powers of the time. After World War I, for example, the victorious powers created some nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe but not in African and Asian areas; and in the former Soviet Union, the great Russian Republic was almost omnipotent in comparison with other national republics and autonomous republics. In some countries, the political forces which insist on a centralized administrative system are strong, while elsewhere, such as in the many developing countries now to be found in the world, even the central government places importance on regional balance in terms of the economy and the redistribution of economic resources, even at the sacrifice of the optimum efficiency of the national economy as a whole. Japan, after the Meiji restoration, always evinced a big regional economic disparity, with Southwestern Japan exercising a cultural hegemony over Northeastern Japan; but the central government was strong enough to suppress almost completely all regionalist movements. 3) Protagonists in the raising of regional problems. Even when a huge regional disparity or regional inequality or discrimination already exists, without the existence of a protagonist or movement to bring the matter up, regional problems do not become explicit. Very often, movements based on great tradition and on little tradition take different directions. Moreover, protagonists or movements instrumental in raising regional problems do not always emerge from the regions discriminated against or from suffering or exploited regions; sometimes they come from wealthy and advantaged regions such as Catalan in Spain or Slovenia and Croatia in the former Yugoslavia. Sometimes a movement aimed at calling attention to regional problems is made use of for other political purposes, on the part of other powers. In the 1930s, for instance, in the rare case of the occurrence of a regional movement in Japan, steps were taken with a view to relieving the poverty of the Tohoku region (Northeastern Japan); but the militarists of ultranationalist Japan made use of this movement to advocate expansionism in the Asian continent, especially in Manchuria. Because regional problems are relevant in economic and political terms to national society, it becomes necessary for many interested groups, very often in opposition to one another, to clarify their position with regard to the problems in question. In this sense, regional problems have always taken the form of ideological issues, in the light of which it is possible to establish the intellectual history of regional problems. As an example of this process, we endeavor to trace the development of the problems of Southern Italy (Mezzogiorno). 1) Period immediately after the unification of Italy (1860s). In this period, the problem in question was first created by the politicians of Northern Italy, who felt overwhelmed by the difficulty of the social and economic integration of the country, and by the disillusioned peasantry of the South, who expressed their dissatisfaction through rioting. 2) Proposals regarding Southern problems by a limited number of Northern intellectuals (1870s). 3) Proposals regarding problems by Southern intellectuals in the form of meridionalismo (from the 1880s up to around 1910). Their ideological position varied somewhat, from anarchism and socialism to romantic idealism, but they commonly recognized that the South had been exploited after unification, and for this reason insisted on regional measures to compensate for this exploitation. 4) World War I and the period of the Fascist Government. There is no doubt that the development measures in the South instigated by Mussolini were successful, especially in the 1920s, but the Fascist Government always insisted demagogicaly that the Southern problem no longer existed. All the political powers other than the Fascists went underground, and the ideological legacy of meridionalismo was inherited by the Italian Popular Party (later the Christian Democrats) and by the Socialist and Communist Parties. 5) New meridionalismo and the positive commitment of the central government with regard to the development policy of the South after 1950 up to 1986. Here it is necessary to take into consideration the impact of European integration, the experience of Keynesian policy in the 1930s in Britain and the United States, and the strong influence of the Christian Democrats and Communists in the post-war Italian political scene, all of which form the background of this new phase. In this period, a huge public investment was made in the South, which apparently indicated an interregional income transfer; but actually, the larger part of the wide spread effects of this public investment were absorbed by private industrial sectors of the North. 6) Toning down and end of the Southern development policy. It is rather difficult to assess this new phase, but it is certain that after 1986, all political powers, not only that of the Northern League but also the Christian Democrats and Communists, agreed to decrease public spending in the South in order to cope with the increasing public deficit. We should also note that with the advancement of the economic integration of Europe, the wide spread effects of the public investments in the South were absorbed less and less by the Northern private sector, and more and more by the industries of other European countries; and that on the other hand, social issues other than the Southern problem, such as problems regarding foreign immigrant laborers and problems of the inner city, are becoming more relevant to Italian society. After the end of the Cold War the coalition government headed by the Christian Democrats lost its raison d'être, and with the participation of the Northern League in the government, the development policy of the South came to a de facto end.