Bienestar animal y derechos de los animales. Regulación y jurisprudencia argentinas

Abstract

The literature on animal ethics and the animal liberation movement distinguish between two positions that are considered antagonistic with respect to what we owe animals. On the one hand, there are those theories and agendas that seek liberation from all forms of animal oppression. The foundations of these positions are diverse. But, despite their differences, they are generally identified as "abolitionist" or in favor of the legal recognition of fundamental rights to life, liberty and integrity for animals. On the other hand, the literature identifies "welfarism" at the opposite pole. Welfarism, or more generally discussing what we owe animals in terms of animal welfare, is a position in which the exploitation of animals is not criticized. The only limit to exploitation is unnecessary suffering. The debate between abolitionism and welfarism has generated a great debate, and this article does not seek to make an exhaustive exploration of the various arguments in this regard. However, that discussion will be briefly presented to review two aspects that this strong dichotomy has left out of focus: what is meant by animal welfare and how legislation, and caselaw, have resorted to some concepts of animal welfare science to guarantee ̶ some ̶ rights for ̶ some ̶ animals. These two dimensions, I will argue, would make it possible to break new ground by using, where relevant, animal welfare regulation itself to ground at least some animal rights ̶ without having to abandon the idea that animals have fundamental rights that should be explicitly recognized by legal systems.