Phenomenology and social theory

Abstract

This article discusses the concept of “word of daily life”, one of the most important contributions of A. Schutz’s “phenomenological sociology” to contemporary social theory. We argue that the fundamental premise of this concept refers primarily to the question of action (the flow of activities always in the process of transformation and realization) and not only of meaning. We start from the assumption that his theory assumes an “ontological character”: human existence consists in being in the world and it is proper to the human being to act. Action is always circumstantial, requires an “initial impetus” (motive) and is essentially constituted as an ongoing process (path), which differs from the “act” (the result of this path, the action taken). The meanings, produced in the flow of activities, are interpretations of past experiences. This premise raises a challenge for sociology: how to deal with a reality that in itself is temporal, plural, uncertain?