Supervision of the default risk of online car‐hailing platform from an evolutionary game perspective

Abstract

Online car‐hailing services are becoming a key component of the public transportation system, despite there being some certain risks, especially default risk. Turning to the evolutionary game method, this research constructed an evolutionary game model of online car‐hailing platform, and then analyzed the equilibrium state of three scenarios (i.e., no supervision, internal supervision of platform enterprises, and external supervision of regulators), followed by carrying out a simula-tion. The results showed that to realize the evolution stability strategies (ESS) of default risk control, a strong credit constraint or the establishment of a coordinated supervision mode with appropriate intensity are needed. On this basis, this research puts forward the coordinated “platform enterprise + regulator” supervision mode, as well as the following four specific strategies: Promoting the construction of a credit system, strengthening the construction of laws and regulations, establishing a service process control mechanism, and introducing innovative regulatory means.