Consider the xenobot: moral status for intelligent machines revisited

Abstract

Can intelligent machines be morally considerable? Should they be? For environmental ethicists, the answer to both questions is plainly ‘no.’ That is, because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are neither alive nor natural they do not warrant moral concern. But these conclusions are not shared by philosophers of technology, who find artifacts in general and certain technological entities in particular eligible for moral status. In this essay, we seek to overcome this discrepancy by arguing that intelligent machines can and should be morally considerable. We show how environmental ethics has neglected important insights from philosophy of technology, inadequately assessed the status of technology in the Anthropocene, and failed to appreciate a pluriversal view of ethics. We illustrate the possibility and necessity of expanding the moral universe to include intelligent machines by presenting a most likely case for moral considerability under both environmental ethics and philosophy of technology–the xenobot.