Internal Control Quality and Boardroom Backscratching

Abstract

In modern firms, conflicts may arise between the chief executive officer and board of directors due to the separation of ownership and operations. Such conflicts may weaken listed companies’ performance in the short term or affect their development in the long term. Using data on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022, this study empirically examines the impact of internal control quality on boardroom backscratching. We find that internal control quality significantly mitigates boardroom backscratching by reducing agency costs and increasing analyst attention. This effect is more significant in firms where the management holds less power and the product market is highly competitive. Furthermore, the mitigating effects of internal control quality on boardroom backscratching effectively reduce the risk of the company’s share price collapsing. Overall, this study enriches the literature on boardroom backscratching and internal control quality, and provides valuable references for stakeholders, including listed companies, to improve firm governance efficiency and, thus, maintain the stability of capital markets.