In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity. While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson (J Econ Theory, 42: 50-58, 1987), this paper introduces local strong d-monotonicity and derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be locally strongly d-monotonic. This characterization is given by using the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d. Moverover, we present a sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be strong d-monotonic. © 2007 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Engwerda, J. C., & Douven, R. C. (2008). On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution. International Journal of Game Theory, 37(2), 265–279. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0113-2
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