Contributors and free-riders in collaborative governance: A computational exploration of social motivation and its effects

Abstract

Collaborative governance systems are likely to be populated by participants with a mix of social or public service motivations, including both proself and prosocial orientations. However, these variations in motivation have not been adequately considered in the development of theory regarding participants’ interaction and group performance in collaborative governance. For this study, we develop an agent-based simulation model that incorporates insights from public administration, social psychology, and behavioral economics, the results from which suggest a number of theoretical propositions regarding the effects of the distribution of and patterns of adjustment in actors’ social motivation on outcomes in collaborative governance situations. In contrast to literature that has paid primary attention to free-riders and the role of punishment in sustaining collaboration, we suggest that more theoretical and practical attention needs to be given to the prosocial motivation of actors and their interactions so as to facilitate a virtuous circle of collaboration in public collaborative governance.