Trojan Attack on the Initialization of Pseudo-Random Bit Generators Using Synchronization of Chaotic Input Sources

Abstract

This paper deals with a safety problem of entropy sources in deterministic random bit generators. An initialization input attack on a set of two pseudo-random generators using analog-digital hardware Trojan is presented. Trojan circuit implementations are discussed following their full classification. Simulation results confirming the effectiveness of the Trojan impact on a repetition of identical seed values are analyzed. Trojan structure is integrated with the deterministic random bit generator functional model recommended by NIST and the task is to impact two seed generators (in two channels), which use the independent Chua circuits as the sources of entropy. The analog Trojan part causes synchronization of the two analog chaotic circuits as explained by the results of LTSpice simulation. The digital Trojan part controls the analog part and modifies the values of optional parameters used in the creation of the seeds. The seed value creation in two cases (with and without Trojan) are simulated by using Xilinx ISIM.