The impact of credit guarantee on enterprises' willingness to undertake environmental responsibilities: Evidence from a dynamic evolutionary game model

Abstract

Evolutionary game is a powerful tool for exploring the interactive strategies of enterprises, governments, and third-party platform institutions that provide credit guarantees. In the context of big data and the Internet of Things, as more and more enterprises participate in the collective process of credit shaping, this series of platform-based credit ratings have a profound impact on the environmental willingness of enterprises. This article constructs an evolutionary game model of enterprise government with the introduction of credit guarantee mechanism, explores the evolution of participant behavior and their Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS), and uses MATLAB tools for evolutionary simulation to explore the impact of relevant parameters on the system evolution results. The results have shown that the selection of environmental protection strategies by enterprises is a dynamic process of continuous adjustment and optimization; The government can help the evolutionary game converge to an ideal state by providing reward subsidies and strengthening punishment measures; The intervention of credit guarantees has influenced the strategic choices of both parties, promoting the willingness of enterprises to actively fulfill their environmental responsibilities.