Congressional use of authorization and oversight

Abstract

This article addresses two questions found in the transaction-cost literature on congressional control of the federal bureaucracy. The first question is, when does Congress seek to exercise control over federal agencies? Drawing in part on the work of Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner (2003) and Cox (2004), this project examines congressional use of statutory controls and oversight across different levels of public salience, technical complexity, and political conflict in executive agencies. I find mixed effects for these variables on the two methods of legislative control. The second question is, are ex ante controls (i.e., constraints enacted in authorizing legislation) and ex post controls (i.e., more traditionally conceived legislative oversight activity) substitutes? Bawn (1997) and Huber and Shipan (2002) suggest this is the case, but I find no evidence for the substitution hypothesis across the different policy areas. © American University, Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies.