The Kosovo Model: A (Bad) Precedent for Conflict Management in the Caucasus?

Abstract

Resolution 1244 adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1999 was conceived as an interim settlement to allow conflict de-escalation while post-poning the search for a lasting solution to the Kosovo crisis. The final settlement should have been negotiated between Serbian authorities and representatives of the Kosovo Albanians and then endorsed by the UNSC, as stipulated in the resolution. However, Kosovo Albanians declared independence unilaterally in February 2008 and Kosovo was recognized as such by the United States and its allies. The Kosovo Albanians promptly abandoned the peace process. Instead of an internationally-endorsed negotiated outcome, the Kosovo Albanians' initiative unilaterally imposed a political settlement on the mediating powers in complete disregard of UNSC authority that had placed Kosovo under international administration. The subsequent involvement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) failed to resolve the remaining issues between Serbs and Kosovars. In addition to creating a troubling legal precedent, the Kosovo example establishes a bad precedent for future conflict management initiatives, especially for ongoing conflicts in the Caucasus. Issues of concern include the viability of future interim agreements, good faith negotiations and the legitimacy and guarantees provided by the internationalization of conflicts, including the authority of international organizations, multilateral agencies and established legal standards. This paper draws parallels between the Kosovo example and territorial disputes in the Caucasus as well as the implications of the Kosovo model on conflict management processes.