Introduction: Alternative theoretical perspectives

Abstract

The analysis of the foreign policies of the United States since the start of the Second World War reveals the behavior of a powerful but fallible international actor. It exposes an entity that, despite its extraordinary material capabilities, often failed to comprehend the nature of the forces besetting the international system or to anticipate the actions of rivals. It shows an actor that too often allowed a rigid mindset to dictate its interpretations of the international challenges it faced and that from time to time reacted to crises without thoroughly assessing the information at its disposal. It reveals a state that sometimes chose a response without systematically comparing it with other possible alternatives and without considering carefully the consequences such a response might generate. However, the analysis also unveils an international player that, in quite a few instances, paused long enough to define the problems it faced, to unravel the mixed signals emitted by the incomplete information generated by its intelligence agencies, to weigh a range of options, and to select the policy that, in addition to having the greatest chance of maximizing its most wanted goals, would generate the fewest number of unwanted consequences.