Regulating labour dispatch in China: A cat-and-mouse game

Abstract

This article suggests cautious optimism toward the prevailing Polanyian countermovement discourse by providing a timely and comprehensive examination of the enforcement of the labour dispatch regulation in China. Since the enactment of the regulation, some enterprises have narrowed the remuneration gap between agency workers and formal employees, while others have retained a large gap in overtime pay, bonuses, and welfare benefits between these two groups of workers. The regulation has reduced the number of agency workers, but has invoked the abuse of the more precarious ‘outsourced’ workers as well. The regulation has had little effect on limiting the use of agency labour to temporary, auxiliary, or substitute positions, raising the requirements of engaging in the labour dispatch business, or stabilizing the employment of agency workers. This article contributes to the extant literature on regulatory enforcement by examining the effects of non-standard employment regulation, highlighting the variance of labour law compliance among enterprises with different types of ownership, and demonstrating how China’s ongoing transformation from a planned to a market economy since the 1980s and from high growth to a new normal since 2010 has fundamentally constrained the full implementation of its labour protection regulation.