Phenomenon of Interest, Framework, or Theory? Building Better Explanations in Community Psychology

Abstract

Theories are a fundamental part of research. They provide guidance for the development of research questions and testable hypotheses as well as inform study methods and designs. However, in this issue, Jason, Stevens, Ram, Miller, Beasley, and Gleason (2016) raise important questions including: Are prominent “theories” in community psychology really theories? How useful are these “theories” for developing specific predictions and testable hypotheses? And, how can the field continue to develop and test theories that promote its agenda of social change? To answer these questions, Jason et al. (2016) identify and evaluate three “prominent theories” in community psychology – the ecological perspective (Kelly, 1968), psychological sense of community theory (Sarason, 1974), and empowerment (Rappaport, 1981). Based on their evaluation, they “conclude that community psychology theories have tended to function as frameworks” (p.  2). That is, these “theories” provide general guidance for what elements to study but fall short of offering specific predictions about the relationships between these elements. Jason et al (2016) conclude that the lack of predictive and explanatory theories in community psychology hinders progress in both the research development of explanatory mechanisms of social change as well as practice initiatives to promote social change. However, despite these major contributions, in this response I contend that the “prominent theories” identified by Jason et al (2016) were never intended to be theories in the first place. While Jason et al (2016) are right to call for more application of theory in community psychology, I provide a more optimistic view of the field’s current use of theory.