Corrected Game Model in CSR: MNC Strategies and Chinese Practice

Abstract

Multinational Corporation (MNC) behaviors (Hoffman et al, 2017) have come under growing scrutiny, and many MNCs have been found to be following lax corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards. MNCs are being held to a standard of new sustainability paradigm, which is challenging them to develop new models of CSR decision making. We represent the CSR decision making challenges of MNCs with the help of a game theoretical model. The model specifies alternative strategies and payoffs for the MNCs and the stakeholders and examines the dominant strategies in the Nash equilibrium. To identify solutions for the future, we propose a corrected game model, where the incentive structure is revised so that the stakeholders are able to signal rewards and penalties for CSR behavior. In this corrected game model, the dominant strategy for the MNCs is to step up their CSR compliance, and for the stakeholders is to offer rewards for the CSR behavior.