Abstract
The paper argues that the principle of technological neutrality in copyright law is best grasped, not as a policy-driven imperative seeking to adapt copyright law to the exigencies of the digital environment, but rather as a principle immanent in the modern concept of copyright subject matter providing that merely technical or non-expressive uses of works of authorship do not attract liability. Technological neutrality is but a corollary of originality; that is, of the elementary proposition that copyright law protects original expression and nothing but original expression.
Author supplied keywords
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Drassinower, A. (2022). Remarks on technological neutrality in copyright law as a subject matter problem: Lessons from canada. Cambridge Law Journal, 81(1), 50–83. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197321001045
Register to see more suggestions
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.