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Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality

  • Rolla G
Manuscrito (2016) 39(3) 5-28
DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n3.gr
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that

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APA

Rolla, G. (2016). Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality. Manuscrito, 39(3), 5–28. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n3.gr

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