Perceptual inhibition of expected inputs: The key that opens closed minds

Abstract

The mind appears to be biased simultaneously toward both expected and unexpected inputs. For example, familiar scenes are usually perceived more readily than novel scenes, indicating the former bias, but a single novel object sometimes pops out from a familiar field, indicating the latter bias. A diverse literature and a computational model converge on the following resolution to this paradox: The former bias is conceptually driven and actually suppresses data-driven processing of expected inputs; in turn, this suppression disinhibits data-driven processing of unexpected inputs, yielding the latter bias. Evidence for suppressed data-driven processing of expected inputs is drawn from studies of perceptual habituation, semantic satiation, memory inhibition, inhibition of return, repetition blindness, primed inhibition, the word-inferiority effect, registration without learning, and both expert- and schema-based inhibitory effects. Evidence for enhanced data-driven processing of unexpected inputs is drawn from studies of the orienting response, mismatch negativity, memory facilitation, both expert- and schema-based facilitatory effects, and perceptual popout. The model, called mismatch theory, incorporates inhibitory and facilitatory perceptual dynamics and is found to simulate the opposing biases. Implications of mismatch theory for perceptual phenomenology, dynamic systems theory, mental health, and individual differences are also discussed. © 1994 Psychonomic Society, Inc.