The interaction between bim's promotion and interest game under information asymmetry

Abstract

The application of Building Information Modeling can break the barrier between project owner and contractor. However, its application may cause an interest con ict between them. The con ict is focusing on the scramble for potential benefits brought by information asymmetry, and it may hinder the application of BIM in reverse. Focusing on information asymmetry, this research analyzed the interaction between BIM's promotion and project owner, contractor's interest game by combining Asymmetric Information theory and game theory. Based on the description of the interest con ict process, this research built a modified Principal-Agent model. By numerical analysis, it is proved that through BIM's effect of reducing information asymmetry in project, BIM's negative impact on contractors profit may let contractor refuse BIM's contract which will finally lead to the failure of BIM's promotion. Then, this research simulated the interest con ict by using the modified PA model. Through comparative analysis on the results, this research suggested:1) project owners should choose BIM at proper stage but not the most advanced one, 2) contractor's effort cannot be ignored when promoting BIM, 3) variety of policies should be made in order to deal with specific problems when promoting BIM at different stages.