Tacit Coordination of Expectations in Everyday Interactions: A Formalization of E. Goffman’s Ideas

Abstract

This study attempted to clarify the tacit coordination mechanism behind participant expectations of everyday interaction. For the purpose of this study, we constructed a formal model consistent with game theory by drawing on an examination of Goffman’s ideas presented in “Fun in games”. This model explains the mechanism that drives the dynamics of making sense process by participants. Then, to demonstrate the model, we analyze an instance of everyday interaction, which consisted of the selection of the next singer at a “karaoke box”. Therefore, the validity of the model was demonstrated, and it was revealed that the model is applicable to equilibrium selection in not only coordination game but also chickin game. Finally, it was suggested that this study might contribute to the study of interaction in public spaces, for example, a circumstance in which an individual gives his or her seat to an aged or sick person on a train, because our model can explain tacit coordination through a delineation of the rules by which participants prioritize the benefit of others or groups over their own.