Abstract
We design multi-unit auctions for budget-constrained bidders in the Bayesian setting. Our auctions are supply-monotone, which allows the auction to be run online without knowing the number of items in advance, and achieve asymptotic revenue optimality. We also give an efficient algorithm for implementing our auction by using a succinct and efficiently implementable characterization of supply-monotonicity in the Bayesian setting.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Deng, Y., & Panigrahi, D. (2019). Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (pp. 173–192). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.12
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