INVENTION WITHHOLDING IN COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Abstract

Inventions improve innovation, competitiveness, and performance. However, organizations do not always have access to inventions made by their employees. This occurs when employees withhold inventions from their employer and instead develop them in collaboration with other organizations or by establishing their own start-ups. Despite the important role of inventions and extant research on technology transfer in universities, research on invention withholding in commercial organizations is relatively scarce. We address this lacuna by showing that withholding and not disclosing inventions are distinct choices on a wider continuum between acts of commission and omission. Our study confirms that withholding, the deliberate choice to conceal inventions from employers, transcends the mere act of nondisclosure, which typically reflects employees’ passive disengagement or withdrawal. As organizations cannot address a behavioral pattern that they fail to fully recognize, we introduce an invention withholding measurement tool. We provide preliminary exploration of the sociopsychological and economic factors influencing invention withholding, and encourage managers and policymakers to devise practices to demotivate employees from withholding inventions, thereby improving innovation in commercial enterprises.