Abstract
This paper addresses the role of non-binding goals to attenuate time inconsistency. Present-biased agents have linear reference-dependent preferences and endogenously set a goal that is the reference point. They face an infinite horizon, optimal stopping problem in continuous time. When there is sufficient commitment to expectation-based goals, goal-setting attenuates the present-biased agent's tendency to stop too early, and may even lead an agent to wait longer than the first-best. In particular, reference dependence is strictly worse for a time-consistent agent. Notably, none of the effects of goal-setting require loss aversion. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
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Hsiaw, A. (2013). Goal-setting and self-control. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(2), 601–626. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.001
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