The impact of intermediaries on a negotiation: an approach from game theory

Abstract

Standard approaches to model interaction networks are limited in their capacity to describe the nuances of real communication. We present a game theoretical framework to quantify the effect of intermediaries on the interaction between agents. Inspired by the seminal work Myerson (1977). on cooperative structures in cooperative games, we set the basis for multidimensional network analysis within game theory. More specifically, an extension of the point-arc game Feltkamp and van den Nouwe51 land (1992). is introduced, generalizing the analysis of cooperative games to multigraphs. An efficient algorithm is proposed for the computation of Shapley value of this game. We prove the validity of our approach by applying it to a intermediaries network model. We are able to recover meaningful results on the dependence of the game outcome on the intermediaries network. This work contributes to the optimal design of networks in economic environments and allows the ranking of players in complex networks.