Pricing and Carbon-Emission-Reduction Decisions under the BOPS Mode with Low-Carbon Preference from Customers

Abstract

The need to mitigate the impacts of climate change has been a worldwide consensus. Cap and trade regulations have been introduced to make the world achieve carbon peaks and neutrality. There are also growing concerns regarding low carbon management. Considering both cap and trade regulations and low-carbon preferences from customers, this study focuses on reducing carbon emissions and pricing decisions in the dual-channel supply chain based on game theory. Furthermore, it analyzes the effects of low-carbon preference (LCP) on emission-reduction efforts and the profits of supply chain members. Finally, it investigates the impact of promoting low-carbon products on optimal decisions and profits. The results conclude that (1) the growth of customers’ LCP level motivates the manufacturer to have more investment in emission reduction with the BOPS unit compensation or full-sales transfer mode; (2) the increase in customers’ LCP level would benefit the supply chain members; (3) the joint emission-reduction strategy can strengthen the positive impact of LCP level on the manufacturer’s emission-reduction effort and the profits supply chain members; and (4) the joint emission-reduction strategy is preferable for the supply chain members compared to the single emission-reduction strategy. However, the joint emission strategy is not always better than the single emission strategy with respect to the selling price. Finally, it provides managerial implications for decision-makers and potential issues for future research.