Determinants of Electoral Budget Cycles and Its Relationship with the Likelihood of Re-election of Mayor in State of Parana (Brazil)

Abstract

www.ccsenet.org/par Public Administration Research Vol. 3, No. 2; 2014 112 debt recorded in public statements, in their elections. In their study, noting the use of Politics in a position to enable the individual approval ratings, have found ways to deceive the voters and thus increase the chances of re-election. Araújo Jr. et al (2002) found slightly jarring to the ideology of EBC for municipalities of Minas Gerais and concluded, based on the results of 2000, municipal election year in Brazil, which encourages the re-election fiscal behavior more responsible for municipal governments, except those recently emancipated. The politician stressed that realizing clear chances for re-election does not contract debts excessive as they need to rebalance them later, but in return, not being a candidate or no chance of being reelected, will tend to influence the action of his successor raising the level of debt public. Meneguin et al (2003) developed econometric study, which examined the fiscal data for variables with the fact that the Mayor or may not be the same party as the governor and president. The results of this survey indicated that the higher the chances for re-election, will be more controlled spending of local governments. This behavior becomes even stronger as the public expenditure per capita increases. When it discriminates between costs and investment spending, it appears that the voter condemns the first and the last awards, confirming its premise that public works appeal to the electorate. On the revenue side, the voter favors the ruler who can afford the municipality, especially those who are not obtained through tax policy. Klein (2009) studied whether Mayors who adhere to the Electoral Cycles, are more likely to re-election. The author used the logit regression to assess whether the mayors of the 5,519 Brazilian municipalities increased spending during the municipal election. The result showed that in the period 2000 to 2004, re-elected mayors spend 3% more that are not reelected, and in addition, the mayors who increase their spending during election years, automatically increase your chances of re-election. These are, therefore, indicative of the different influence on the part of election cycles in the daily life of citizens, and that demands more and multidisciplinary scientific research, so you can see the extent that businesses can achieve partisan political in times of elections.