The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need for Renewal and Redefinition

Abstract

The Army that won the battles of the Gulf War in 1991 was one of the most professional ever fielded by America. As General Schwarzkopf commented, "We could have traded equipment with the Iraqis and still won."[1] And when that Army returned home, it was welcomed by a supportive, even adoring, public. Now, almost one decade later, the situation has changed dramatically. During the past nine years, the US Army has undergone radical changes--major force and budget reductions, revised modernization programs, and successive base realignments and closures. All were intended by design to adapt the institution to the post-Cold War geopolitical situation. But there are many indications that the result is an Army quite unlike the victor of the Gulf War battles. It is instead an Army of decreasing effectiveness, one which suffers from a weakening relationship with the American public and, of more concern, with its own members. The last decade has been one of massive change to which the Army profession has yet to adapt fully. Simply stated, the end of the Cold War, which roughly coincided with the culmination of other shifts in the organization of Western, postindustrial societies, has drastically altered the expectations of where and how the profession of arms will apply its expertise. Today, in this new interwar period,[2] the Army is expected to operate effectively across the entire spectrum of violence, from major theater wars to domestic disaster relief. Further, it must be prepared to conduct these varied operations worldwide in any physical and political environment, and to do so in very rapid order. With these shifts in society's expectations came the need for a huge expansion in the profession's knowledge base and in the application of that expert knowledge to new situations. Such growth in expertise should have generated changes throughout the Army's leadership and management systems--from organizational structure to applied technology, from measures of readiness to measures of effectiveness, and from military training systems to professional military education. The Army is faltering, however, in its attempts to adapt to these stark changes; this inability to adapt is itself a significant manifestation of a decline in effectiveness. Unfortunately, this potentially dangerous situation remains, at the systemic level, largely unrecognized by the institution. Even worse, it is not clear that there is currently within the officer corps of the Army a consensus on just what "Army Professionalism" is, nor a common language with which to analyze and discuss it. Absent such analysis and dialogue, the Army is looking elsewhere for solutions to the decline in effectiveness by studying individually the recurring symptoms as they reach crisis proportions, such as recruiting shortfalls, an exodus of captains, unfunded adaptations in structure and technology, and leadership failures.