Collective Self-Determination, Territory and the Wet'suwet'en: What Justifies the Political Authority of Historic Indigenous Governments over Land and People?

Abstract

This article examines the Wet'suwet'en people's struggle for territorial control over their traditional homeland from the normative perspective of collective self-determination. I focus on two interlocking philosophical questions that arise in examination of the case: the justification for a group's right to control territory and the justification for the right of political institutions and officials within those institutions to make and enforce law for the occupants of the territory. I argue that, pursuant to the collective self-determination theory of territorial rights, the legitimate representatives of the Wet'suwet'en people must reflect the people's shared will. After describing the traditional governance system of the Wet'suwet'en people, I argue that there is nothing in principle preventing the hereditary chiefs from reflecting the shared will of the Wet'suwet'en people (as I argue electoral democracy is not always necessary for collective self-determination). I illustrate several reasons why hereditary leaders could reflect the shared will of Wet'suwet'en people better than alternative political authorities, while demonstrating that the political authority of any Wet'suwet'en governance system depends upon the actual endorsement of Wet'suwet'en people themselves.