Abstract
This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher-status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensation is delayed; and (iii) past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization's hierarchy. Copyright © 2008, RAND.
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CITATION STYLE
Auriol, E., & Renault, R. (2008). Status and incentives. RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 305–326. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00015.x
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