Status and incentives

55Citations
Citations of this article
69Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher-status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensation is delayed; and (iii) past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization's hierarchy. Copyright © 2008, RAND.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Auriol, E., & Renault, R. (2008). Status and incentives. RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 305–326. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00015.x

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free