Penyalahgunaan Kewenangan DPR dalam Penggantian Hakim Konstitusi: Ancaman terhadap Independensi Peradilan

Abstract

The replacement of a Constitutional Court judge by the House of Representatives (DPR) has sparked debates on the limits of institutional authority and its impact on judicial independence. This study examines whether the replacement of Constitutional Court Judge Aswanto aligns with constitutional functions and laws, as well as its implications for the independence of the Constitutional Court. Using normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, and case-based approaches, the study finds that the DPR’s actions violated legal procedures and lacked constitutional grounds. The DPR has no authority to unilaterally dismiss a Constitutional Court judge, as the relationship between the nominating institution and the appointed judge is equal rather than hierarchical. This unlawful replacement not only raises legal questions regarding the validity of Constitutional Court decisions but also threatens judicial independence. Institutionally, it sets a precedent for political interference in judicial processes. Functionally, it pressures judges to conform their rulings to the political interests of nominating institutions.