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Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior

  • Cooter R
  • Marks S
  • Mnookin R
The Journal of Legal Studies (1982) 11(2) 225-251
DOI: 10.1086/467699
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Abstract

Examines the fundamental cause of pretrial bargaining. Characteristics of bargaining in the shadow of the law; Association between player optimism and trial; Factors influencing the outcome of pre-trial bargaining.

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APA

Cooter, R., Marks, S., & Mnookin, R. (1982). Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior. The Journal of Legal Studies, 11(2), 225–251. https://doi.org/10.1086/467699

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